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“I want to make sure that the America we see from 
these major highways is a beautiful America.” 
 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, 
January 1965.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
President Johnson’s commitment to highway beautification 
has had a lasting impact on the landscape of America.  During the 
first half of the twentieth century, the road system in America 
experienced unprecedented growth.  With this expansion came an 
explosion of billboards along the country’s highways, affectionately 
dubbed by environmentalists as “visual pollution,” “sky trash,” 
“litter on a stick,” and “the junk mail of the American highway.”2  
President Johnson took notice of the public’s disgust at the marred 
national landscape.  In 1965 he introduced the Highway 
Beautification Act, aimed to induce state regulation of billboards 
along major highways.3  Instead of a wholesale ban on billboards, 
the legislation limits their use to areas zoned for either commercial 
or industrial activities.4  Since the enactment of the Highway 
Beautification Act, there are 875,000 fewer signs along controlled 
highways.5 
In a recent case, In the Matter of the Denial of Eller Media 
Company’s Applications for Outdoor Advertising Device Permits in the City 
of Mounds View, a city-owned golf course encountered financial 
difficulties.6  The City of Mounds View attempted to increase the 
course’s revenue through the sale of billboard space on golf course 
land adjacent to a major highway.7  The Minnesota Department of 
 
 1. Federal Highway Administration, How the Highway Beautification Act Became 
a Law, at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/beauty.htm. 
 2. Scenic America, Billboards, at http://www.scenic.org/billboardsign/ 
billboardsign.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, 1028-33 (1965) (codified as amended at 
23 U.S.C. § 131 (2000)). 
 4. See id. 
 5. Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Laws and Regulations, at 
http://www.oaaa.org/government/laws.asp#fhwa. An estimated 500,000 
billboards exist along major American highways today.  Scenic America, Fight 
Billboard Blight: Billboards by the Numbers, at http://www.scenic.org/billboardsign/ 
blightnumbers.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 6. 664 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003) [hereinafter Eller Media]. 
 7. Id. at 4. 
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Transportation8 denied the city’s permits on the ground that the 
erection of billboards on the golf course violated the Minnesota 
Outdoor Advertising Control Act.9  By the time the case reached 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court faced the multi-faceted 
issue of whether a municipally owned golf course qualifies as a 
“business area” under the Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control 
Act, in light of the definition of an “industrial or commercial zone” 
under the Highway Beautification Act.10 
This note first examines a brief history of the municipal 
development of the comprehensive plan and outdoor advertising 
control legislation,11 the federal government’s promulgation of the 
Highway Beautification Act,12 and the Minnesota Outdoor 
Advertising Control Act.13  Upon review of the background of the 
Eller Media case,14 this note highlights the opinion rendered by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.15  An analysis of the supreme court’s 
interpretation in light of the outdoor advertising control acts and 
regulations follows,16 including an examination of the policies that 
underlie the pertinent statutes.17 This note concludes that based on 
the state of the golf course today, the supreme court’s strict 
interpretation of the advertising control statutes focused too 
narrowly on the zoning label instead of the actual land use.18 
II. HISTORY 
As the construction of American highways progressed, cars 
allowed the public to navigate the country with ease and the use of 
billboards skyrocketed.19  To some, these signs detracted from the 
 
 8. The Minnesota Department of Transportation is charged with issuing 
permits for billboards along major highways. 
 9. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 2. 
 10. Id. at 6. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.B-C. 
 13. See infra Part II.D. 
 14. See infra Part III.A. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. See infra Part IV.A-C. 
 17. See infra Part IV.D. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. The origin of American billboards can be traced to New York, where, in 
1835, Jared Bell printed large outdoor posters for a circus.  Outdoor Advertising 
Association of America, About Outdoor, at http://www.oaaa.org/outdoor/ 
sales/history.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter About Outdoor].  At first, 
roadside signs advertised local establishments and services.  Id.  The medium 
gained popularity in 1900 when a standardized billboard structure was developed.  
3
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American landscape.20  By the mid-1920s, signs lined America’s 
highways and public outcry against billboards intensified.21  In May 
of 1923, members of the New York State Federation of Women’s 
Clubs began a protest-by-letter campaign against billboards.22  The 
movement gradually spread to other states.23  The women sent 
more than 4,000 letters per month to the top four advertisers in the 
country, urging the advertisers to confine signs to commercial 
locations in order to protect America’s scenic beauty.24  The 
campaign resulted in fourteen national advertisers pledging to 
remove their highway billboards upon the expiration of their 
contracts.25  The beautification movement took flight. 
A. Municipalities Recognize the Need for Zoning Regulation and Demand 
Outdoor Advertising Control Legislation 
The rapid and unpredictable growth of cities in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created a need for 
municipalities to control city development.26  The City of New York 
was the first to do so through the enactment of a comprehensive 
 
Id.  The standardized billboards were twelve feet high and twenty-five feet long.  
PHILLIP TOCKER, Standardized Outdoor Advertising: History, Economics and Self-
Regulation, in OUTDOOR ADVERTISING HISTORY AND REGULATION 11, 39 (John W. 
Houck ed., 1969).  This standardization created a boom in national billboard 
campaigns by allowing advertisers like Palmolive, Kellogg, and Coca-Cola to mass-
produce billboards for the national market.  About Outdoor, supra. 
 20. Scenic America, Fighting Visual Pollution, at http://www.scenic.org/ 
billboardsign/billboardcontrol.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).  Besides scarring 
natural beauty along highways, billboards also have other negative effects.  Id.  
Billboards have been shown to harm the health of Americans by contributing to 
commuter stress.  Id.  A recent Texas A&M University study concluded that 
commuters driving on roads blighted by billboards, sprawl, and strip development 
had higher blood pressure, heart rate, respiration, and increased eye movements 
and facial muscle activity compared to driving on rural roads.  Id.  Billboards are 
also considered safety hazards because they are designed to distract motorists' 
attention from the road.  Id.  Some companies go so far as to remove trees to 
increase the visibility of their billboards from the highway.  Id.  Billboards have a 
negative economic impact on the areas in which they are built.  A study in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, found that property values rose as much as 255% after 
the removal of nearby billboards.  Id.   
 21. Jean Buraet Tompkins, Letter to the Editor, Billboards or Scenery?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1923, at 16. 
 22. Club Women Rally to Billboard Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1923, at E15. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Offensive Outdoor Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1924, at 18. 
 26. 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1:2 (4th ed. 
2004). 
4
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zoning plan in 1916.27  Through the comprehensive plan, the city 
created several zoning districts, such as commercial, residential, 
and industrial, and assigned different types of uses to each zone.28  
Zoning regulation was necessary for cities to implement their 
respective comprehensive plans.29 
Zoning spread rapidly, especially after the Standard State 
Enabling Act was enacted in 1922.30  This legislation empowered 
municipalities to divide themselves into zones and permitted 
regulations to vary between the zones.31  The Enabling Act 
simultaneously restricted the zoning power of municipalities by 
requiring that zoning ordinances be enacted in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan.32  Zoning that benefited individual 
landowners, thus not in accordance with the comprehensive plan, 
was labeled “spot zoning.”33  Spot zoning has been deemed “the 
very antithesis of planned zoning.”34 
Municipal regulation of advertising signs was similarly 
common during the early 1900s.35  The popular demand for 
billboard regulation was so great that thirty-three states adopted 
regulatory statutes during the 1920s.36  By 1958, every state had 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 958 (5th ed. 2002). 
 29. 1 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 5:2.  Zoning is defined as the “legislative 
division of . . . a municipality into separate districts with different regulations 
within the districts for land use, building size, and the like.”   BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1649 (8th ed. 2004). 
 30. DUKEMINIER, supra note 28, at 959. 
 31. Id. at 971. 
 32. Id.  A comprehensive zoning plan is defined as a “general plan to control 
and direct the use and development of a large piece of property.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 304 (8th ed. 2004). 
 33. Spot zoning is described as a zoning change, usually to a small piece of 
land, which creates an island within a larger zoned district that is not consistent 
with the surrounding uses.  State v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. 
1978). 
 34. Jones v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 108 A.2d 498, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1954) (classifying spot zoning as “improper permission” to use a small 
piece of land); see also DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN 
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 136-37 (2d ed. 1986), reprinted in 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 28, at 1005. 
 35. 3 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 16:1.  Municipalities have no inherent power to 
regulate billboards, so such authority must be granted by the state legislature.  
Henry W. Proffitt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L. Q. 151, 160    
(1931). 
 36. Proffitt, supra note 35, at 168.  California prohibited advertisements on 
public property without consent.  Id. at 169.  North Carolina required that written 
consent of the owner of private property must be obtained to place advertisements 
5
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outdoor advertising control legislation.37  At first, the courts did not 
approve of controlling land use for aesthetic purposes.38  However, 
courts began to uphold sign control regulations based on the 
advancement of public health and safety, the preservation of 
property values, and the promotion of tourism.39  Today, billboard 
regulation based on aesthetic concerns alone is an accepted and 
legitimate use of police power.40 
 
on that property.  Id.  New York permitted anyone to remove advertisements from 
areas along public highways which had been placed there without governmental 
permission.  Id at 169-70.  Vermont required licenses for anyone conducting 
outdoor advertising business within the state.  Id. at 170.  Colorado prohibited the 
erection of billboards within 300 feet of intersections or sharp curves if the signs 
would interfere with a driver’s view.  Id.  Arkansas prohibited the erection of 
billboards within 100 yards of a state highway unless permission of the State 
Highway Commission was granted.  Id. at 170-71.  Connecticut prohibited 
billboards within 300 feet of any state highway having any word used to give 
warning to traffic, unless under the authority of Highway Commissioner.  Id. at 
171. 
 37. Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification Act of 
1965 Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 468-69 (2000). 
 38. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting 
Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905), overruled in part by State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821 
(N.J. 1980). “Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence 
rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the 
police power to take private property without compensation.”  Id. 
 39. 3 PATRICK ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 17.03[2] (Eric 
Damian Kelly ed. 1978).  In 1917, the United States Supreme Court upheld an 
Illinois Supreme Court decision which justified a billboard regulation on the basis 
of public health and safety.  Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 
529-31 (1917).  The Illinois court found that deposits behind billboards can breed 
disease which may be scattered by the wind, immoral practices occur under cover 
provided by billboards, and fires can start from combustible material that gathers 
around billboards.  Id. at 529; see also St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. 
Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo. 1911) (holding that billboards are “constant 
menaces to the public safety and welfare of the city; they endanger the public 
health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals 
and all classes of miscreants”). 
 40. See John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 
717 (Mass. 1975) (reasoning that a visually satisfying city tends to contribute to the 
health of the citizens).  The evolution of the change in judicial attitudes can be 
divided into three stages: the early period, where aesthetics was not a basis for 
zoning; the middle period, where aesthetics could be a basis if other grounds were 
present; and the modern period, where aesthetics are acceptable without the need 
for other grounds.  RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY 286-87 (1996).  
The development of the modern attitude toward aesthetics took a major turn in 
1954 when Justice Douglas opined that the concept of public welfare encompasses 
spiritual, physical, aesthetic, and monetary values.  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 
31-32 (1954).  The just compensation requirement and free speech restrictions are 
the most controversial aspects of billboard control regulations, but are beyond the 
scope of this article.  See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514 
6
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B. The Federal Government, Billboard Control, and the Bonus Act 
By the mid-1950s, the federal government felt that its 
leadership was necessary to control outdoor advertising along 
highways due to the varied scope and effectiveness of the state 
regulations.41  Lawmakers were concerned that uncontrolled 
advertising along the Interstate System would decrease highway 
efficiency, impair highway safety, and hinder the enjoyment of 
drivers.42  The federal government justified its involvement in 
billboard regulation along the Interstate System because it 
provided ninety percent of the System’s construction funds.43 
After two failed attempts, the federal government finally made 
real accomplishments in outdoor advertising control with the 
adoption of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958.44  This Act 
prohibited outdoor advertising within 660 feet of the Interstate 
System, but allowed for specific advertising in a narrow set of 
categories.45  The Act earned its nickname, the Bonus Act, from a 
 
(1981) (holding that the city must allow noncommercial billboards in commercial 
and industrial zones because it cannot distinguish between contents of 
noncommercial speech); Eller Media Co. v. Montgomery County, 795 A.2d 728, 
739 (Md. App. 2002) (holding that fair compensation must be paid for the 
removal of billboards despite a reasonable amortization period). 
 41. S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2385. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 2386.  The Interstate System was proposed by President Franklin 
Roosevelt in 1944.  Albert, supra note 37, at 481.  States were not permitted to add 
exits and entrances to the Interstate System without federal consent, and the 
number of Interstate miles was limited.  Id. at 474. 
 44. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89 (1958).  
The first federal level movement in billboard control was led by Senator Richard 
L. Neuberger (D-Ore.), who wrote an amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1955 that would enable the Secretary of Commerce to acquire exclusive 
advertising rights on land adjoining the Interstate System in certain states.  Clifton 
W. Enfield, Federal Highway Beautification: Outdoor Advertising Control, Legislation and 
Regulation, in OUTDOOR ADVERTISING HISTORY AND REGULATION 149, 150 (John W. 
Houck ed., 1969).  This provision was eventually deleted from the bill. Id. at 151.  
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 did not contain any billboard control 
provisions.  Id.  Public response to this omission encouraged further consideration 
of the issue.  Id. at 152.  In 1957, Senator Neuberger once again introduced a bill 
to control outdoor advertising signs.  Id.  This bill would have prohibited all 
outdoor advertising within 750 feet of the Interstate System except directional and 
other official signs, signs advertising the sale or lease of property on which they are 
located, signs advertising activities conducted on the land on which they are 
located, and signs on land zoned commercial or industrial.  Id. at 154.  Instead of 
penalizing states for not complying with the legislation, the complying states would 
be rewarded with a 0.75% increase in federal highway aid.  Id. The Senate 
Committee on Public Works took no action on the bill.  Id. at 156.   
 45. Advertising was allowed if it involved directional and other official signs, 
7
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provision that increased Federal-Aid highway funds by five percent 
to complying states.46 
Critics of the Bonus Act believed that stronger, more effective 
provisions should have been included.47  Others were concerned 
that the Bonus Act would bribe states into passing legislation that 
they might not otherwise pass in order to obtain federal funds.48  
During its seven-year existence, the Bonus Act improved only 195 
miles of highway.49  By the time it expired on June 30, 1965, almost 
$2 million in bonus money had been paid to fourteen states.50 
In 1965, President Johnson, who believed the Bonus Act to be 
ineffective, called a White House Conference on Natural Beauty to 
discuss, among other topics, outdoor advertising control.51  The day 
 
signs advertising the sale or lease of property on which they were located, signs 
advertising activities being conducted within twelve miles of the signs, and signs 
designed to give information in the specific interest of people traveling on the 
highway.  Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89, 95 
(1958).  While the bill was in the Senate, Senator Robert S. Kerr (D-Okla.), 
attempted to amend it to strike provisions related to advertising control.  Enfield, 
supra note 44, at 160.  This amendment was defeated by a vote of forty-one yeas to 
forty-seven nays.  Id.  President Johnson, then a Senator and the Senate majority 
leader, voted in favor of this amendment.  Id. 
 46. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89, 96 
(1958). 
 47. See S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2396 
(stating that the provisions of the bill were at the bare minimum that could be 
done to help interested state governments to act).  The Bonus Act was weakened 
by a provision that excluded portions of the Interstate System constructed on 
rights-of-way that were acquired on or before July 1, 1956, from outdoor 
advertising control.  Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 
89, 96 (1958).  As a result of this amendment, only 65% of the Interstate System 
could be regulated under the Bonus Act.  Joseph C. Ingraham, Billboard Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1961 at XX1. 
 48. S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2400  
(“The pattern is set here for the total destruction of the rights of the States by the 
offering of Federal money to them to take action.”).  The successor to the Bonus 
Act, the Highway Beautification Act, served as a model for other federal statutes, 
including the national 21-year-old legal drinking age and the 55-mile-per-hour 
speed limit.  Albert, supra note 37, at 494, n.135. 
 49. William D. Bruton, Billboard Legislation and the Takings Issue, GEO. U. L. 
CTR. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. n.11 (2001), at http://www.scenicflorida.org/ 
bblegistakings.html#n11 (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).  Only 40,000 miles of new 
Interstate System roads were protected by the Bonus Act, amounting to less than 
3% of the approximately 1,500,000 miles of surfaced public roads and highways.  
S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2396. 
 50. Enfield, supra note 44, at 167. 
 51. Id. at 168.  President Johnson said, “The roads themselves must reflect, in 
location and design, increased respect for the natural and social integrity and 
unity of the landscape and communities through which they pass.”  Albert, supra 
note 37, at 476 (quoting Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and the 
8
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after the conference, President Johnson sent a message to Congress 
that recommended new legislation for outdoor advertising control, 
soon to be known as the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 
(“Beautification Act”).52  The Beautification Act was a product of 
President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives.53  President Johnson 
and the First Lady wanted to bring beauty to the nation’s highways 
by controlling billboards and junkyards.54  At the time, some 
senators speculated that Lady Bird Johnson was the driving force 
behind the bill, which President Johnson once suggested by stating 
that he “must have it for Lady Bird.”55 
C. The Highway Beautification Act 
Upon signing the Beautification Act on October 22, 1965, 
President Johnson promised that as long as he was president, “what 
has been divinely given by nature will not be recklessly taken away 
by man.”56  He was not without opposition.  Critics of the bill 
 
Restoration of Natural Beauty, 1 Pub. Papers 159 (Feb. 8, 1965)). 
 52. Enfield, supra note 44, at 168.  In his letter to the President of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House, President Johnson said that “by acting to bring 
beauty to our roads, by making nature and recreation easily accessible, our 
highway system can become immensely more valuable in serving the needs of the 
American people . . . [a]nd those needs include the opportunity to touch nature 
and see beauty.”  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1084 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3710, 3711. 
 53. Timothy J. Fete, Jr., Comment, Illegal Billboards: Why the General Assembly 
Should Revise the Outdoor Advertising Control Act to Comply with North Carolina Easement 
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2002).  Other agendas included in the Great 
Society program were “aid to education, attack on disease, Medicare, urban 
renewal, . . . conservation, development of depressed regions, a wide-scale fight 
against poverty, control and prevention of crime and delinquency, [and] removal 
of obstacles to the right to vote.”  The White House, Lyndon B. Johnson, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/lj36.html. 
 54. Albert, supra note 37, at 490. 
 55. Billboard Curbs Backed in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1965, at 23.  The 
Senate passed the bill (known as the Beauty Bill) on September 16, 1965, and the 
House began debating on October 7, 1965.  Federal Highway Administration, How 
the Highway Beautification Act Became a Law, at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
infrastructure/beauty.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).  Members of Congress and 
their wives were invited to attend a Salute to Congress at the State Department and 
a White House reception that same evening, and they hoped to bring the bill with 
them as a gift to Lady Bird.  Id.  After hours of debates with their wives waiting, the 
members of the House passed the Beauty Bill at one o’clock in the morning.  Id.  
Some legislators eventually made it to the White House for an early morning 
celebration.  Id. 
 56. John D. Pomfret, President Signs Scenic Road Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1965, 
at 28. 
9
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believed it was so weak that it did more harm than good.57  
Billboard opponents pointed to the billboard industry’s strong 
Washington presence to explain the deficiencies of the anti-
billboard legislation.58  Others were critical of the White House for 
pushing the bill through the legislature without full consideration 
of all the issues and parties affected.59  Opposition aside, the 
Highway Beautification Act was enacted with the general purpose 
of encouraging states to effectively control outdoor advertising and 
thus to “protect the public investment in . . . highways, to promote 
the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve 
natural beauty.”60  The Beautification Act includes three programs: 
outdoor advertising control, junkyard control, and landscaping and 
scenic enhancement.61 
The Beautification Act controls all advertising within 660 feet 
of the Interstate System and the primary highway system.62  
However, signs within 660 feet of a highway are allowed if they are 
directional and official signs, signs that are determined to be 
landmarks, or signs located on areas zoned industrial or 
 
 57. PBS, Lady Bird Johnson, Shattered Dreams, The Beautification Campaign, at 
http://www.pbs.org/ladybird/shattereddreams/shattereddreams_report.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 58. Scenic America, Billboard Control, Fighting Visual Pollution, at http:// 
www.scenic.org/billboardsign/billboardcontrol.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Scenic America].  “[T]he outcome of the legislative process had more 
to do with favoring the interests of the billboard industry than with really putting 
effective control into place.”  Albert, supra note 37, at 494 n.133.  During the 1989-
90 election cycle and the first six months of 1991, campaign contributions to 
House Public Works Committee members totaled over $800,000.  Scenic America, 
supra.  House Transportation Committee Chairman Bud Shuster (R-PA) received 
over $65,000 in contributions from the billboard industry in the 1993-94 election 
cycle.  Id. 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1084 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3736. 
 60. The Highway Beautification Act (“Beautification Act”), 23 U.S.C § 131(a) 
(2000).  Aesthetics were the main concern of the proponents of the Beautification 
Act.  Albert, supra note 37, at 479.  The safety rationale was included to persuade 
senators and congressmen who were not sold on the aesthetic rationale.  Id.  Safety 
also provided a valid basis for states to exercise legislative power.  Id.  But see H.R. 
REP. NO. 89-1084 at 3712 (stating that the outdoor advertising control act is “not in 
any sense to be construed . . . for the use of police power”). 
 61. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, 1028-33 (1965) (codified as amended at 
23 U.S.C. § 131 (2000)). 
 62. 23 U.S.C §§ 131(a)-(c) (2000).  The distance of 660 feet was chosen 
because anti-billboard proponents believed it would not be economically possible 
to construct a billboard large enough to be seen from beyond 660 feet.  Albert, 
supra note 37, at 507.  “Today billboards are larger than they were in 1965” and are 
visible from more than 660 feet.  Id. 
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commercial under state law.63  Signs are also allowed if they 
specifically advertise the sale or lease of property upon which they 
are located, activities conducted on the property on which they are 
located, or free coffee by nonprofit organizations.64  The 
Beautification Act penalizes states that fail to comply with its 
regulations by reducing their respective allocated federal highway 
funds by ten percent.65 
D. The Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control Act 
Minnesota amended its existing outdoor advertising control 
legislation in 1971 to create the Minnesota Outdoor Advertising 
Control Act (“The Minnesota Act”).66  The Minnesota Act attempts 
 
 63. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131(c)-(d) (2000). 
 64. Id.  A 1965 House Report on the Highway Beautification Act expressed 
concern over the inconsistencies between on-premises and off-premises signs:  
“[T]he most offensive signs are those advertising activities conducted on the 
property on which they are located.  All of the Members of this body can visualize 
the ugly appearance of signs, displays, and devices maintained upon the top side, 
and around beer joints, filing stations, general stores, etc.”  H.R. REP. NO. 89-1084 
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3728.  Another concern was that the 
Beautification Act would hinder motorists from locating facilities in unfamiliar 
areas.  Id. at 3730.  Furthermore, the elimination of signs other than “on premise” 
signs and signs within commercial and industrial areas was feared to cause “the 
bankruptcy of thousands of small businesses which are dependent upon the 
patronage of highway users for their existence.” Id. 
 65. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (2000).  As of the year 2000, “no state ha[d] been 
penalized for noncompliance.”  Albert, supra note 37, at 467.   One of the main 
differences between the Beautification Act and the former Bonus Act was the 
manner in which states were induced to comply.  The Bonus Act gave states that 
complied a five percent increase in federal highway aid, while the Beautification 
Act penalized non-complying states by reducing federal highway aid by ten 
percent.  Compare Pub. L. No. 85-381 (1958), 72 Stat. 89, 96 (1958) with 23 U.S.C. § 
131(b) (2000).  At first, President Johnson proposed to cut 100% of federal 
highway aid to states that did not establish effective control of billboards by 
January 1, 1968.  Eric Wentworth, President’s Plan to Combat Highway Blight Draws 
Support of Billboard Owners’ Group, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1954, at 8. Under this 
version, if none of the states complied, the lost aid would have amounted to $3.8 
billion per year in 1965.  Id.  This penalty was too large for many legislators and 
was subsequently changed to a ten percent reduction in federal highway aid.  
Another difference between the Beautification Act and the Bonus Act was the 
amount of area affected.  The Beautification Act applied to the entire 41,000 miles 
of the Interstate System and 228,000 miles of the primary system, while the Bonus 
Act applied only to those portions of the Interstate System built on land acquired 
after 1956.  Enfield, supra note 44, at 174. 
 66. The Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 173.01-
.27 (2002).  The original legislation, designed to comply with the Bonus Act, was 
enacted in 1965 before President Johnson’s Beautification Act.  1965 Minn. Laws 
ch. 827.  “If you are going to have control you may as well comply with federal 
11
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to effectively and reasonably control the erection of advertising 
devices near highways to conserve the “natural beauty” of the 
surrounding land.67  The language of the Minnesota Act recognizes 
not only natural beauty but also the commercial importance of 
outdoor advertising.68  Like the Beautification Act, the Minnesota 
Act allows outdoor advertising where “business and commercial 
activities are conducted.”69  “Business areas” are those areas zoned 
for business, industrial, or commercial activities; these areas 
collectively create the business area exception to Minnesota’s 
 
regulations so that we can receive a bonus to help defray the costs.” Senator 
Knudson, Minutes from the Senate Subcommittee on Billboards, Mar. 17, 1965 
(on file with the Minnesota Historical Society).  Norman Larson, Chairman of the 
Public Highways Committee, summarized the legislation in a report to the 
Minnesota Senate. 
[The bill] controls advertising along the interstate highway system and 
provides for scenic areas where billboard advertising will be at a 
minimum.  In scenic areas established, the control will be, wherever 
practicable, as stringent as the federal law and federal rules and 
regulations require in order that the state may receive federal 
participation in the cost of acquisition of the necessary easements.  
Outside of the scenic areas established, the advertising along the highway 
will be controlled to a point where only approximately four advertising 
devices on each side of the highway will be allowed.  Certain advertising 
that would interfere with safety would be eliminated immediately.  Other 
advertising in place at the effective date of passage of the bill would be 
allowed to remain in place until 1969, at which time they will be removed 
to the extent necessary so that the spacing requirements set forth in the 
bill will be effective. 
Letter from Norman Larson, Chairman of Public Highway Committee, to the 
senators of the 89th Congress 8 (May 21, 1965) (on file with the Minnesota 
Historical Society) (summarizing the bills enacted during 89th legislature that 
affected highways). 
 67. MINN. STAT. § 173.01 (2002). 
 68. “[O]utdoor advertising is an integral part of the business and marketing 
function, an established segment of the national economy, and a legitimate 
commercial use of property . . . it should be allowed to operate where other 
business and commercial activities are conducted.”  Id.  Outdoor advertising 
control legislation in many, but not all, states includes similar language.  See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 23-1-272 (1975) (“The Legislature hereby finds and declares that 
outdoor advertising is a legitimate use of private property adjacent to roads and 
highways.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-70 (2001) (“The General Assembly recognizes 
that the outdoor advertising industry is a bona fide commercial function.”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 68-2231 (2002) (“[O]utdoor advertising is a legitimate, commercial 
use of private property.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 226.500 (2004) (“The general 
assembly finds and declares that outdoor advertising is a legitimate commercial 
use of private property adjacent to the interstate and primary highway systems.”); 
NEV. REV. STAT. 410.220 (2002) (“The erection and maintenance of outdoor 
advertising signs . . . is a legitimate commercial use of private property.”). 
 69. MINN.  STAT. § 173.01 (2002). 
12
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prohibition on outdoor advertising.70  The business area exception 
of the Minnesota Act was not litigated in Minnesota until the Eller 
Media dispute arose.71  Its application, however, was to be in 
compliance with the Highway Beautification Act72 and all applicable 
federal regulations.73 
 
III. THE ELLER MEDIA DECISION 
 
A. Backdrop to the Eller Media Decision 
 
In 1995, the City of Mounds View opened The Bridges, a 
municipally owned golf course that was originally financed by a 
revenue bond.74  The land on which the golf course was built was a 
combination of two zoning districts: an Industrial district and a 
Conservancy, Recreation, and Preservation (“CRP”) district.75  The 
golf course was profitable but unable to pay its full debt payments 
 
 70. A business area is “any part of an adjacent area which is (a) zoned for 
business, industrial or commercial activities under the authority of any law of this 
state or any political subdivision thereof; or (b) not so zoned, but which 
constitutes an unzoned commercial or industrial area as herein defined.”  Id. § 
173.02, subd. 17.  Other exceptions include directional and other official signs, 
signs advertising the sale of the property on which the sign is located, signs 
advertising activities conducted on the property on which the sign is located, signs 
stating the name and address of the owner of the property, public utility signs, 
service club and religious notices, signs which are not visible from the adjacent 
road, and community identification signs.  Id. § 173.08, subd. 1. 
 71. In Minnesota, the Beautification Act has been the subject of only a few 
cases.  See, e.g., State v. Hopf, 323 N.W.2d 746, 755 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a 
provision of the Minnesota Act that prohibits signs near schools and churches but 
permits signs in business areas was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments); State v. Lutsen Resorts, Inc., 310 N.W.2d 495, 496-97 (Minn. 1981) 
(holding that condemnation of signs pursuant to the Minnesota Act did not deny 
sign owners equal protection, despite  the state's continued maintenance of its 
own signs); State v. Weber-Connelly, Naegele, Inc. 448 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that condemnation under the Minnesota Act requires 
compensation for lost income). 
 72. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (2000). 
 73. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.701-713 (2004). 
 74. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003).   
 75. Id.  In 1988, the State of Minnesota quitclaimed CRP-zoned land, which 
was later developed into the golf course, to the city.  Id.  “The deed contained a 
provision that the property would revert back to the state if it was not used for a 
public purpose.”  Id.  The other portion of the golf course was acquired from 
Sysco Foods in 1989, which was rezoned from Industrial to Public Facilities.  In re 
Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device Permits in the 
City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 604 
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003). 
13
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in both 1998 and 1999.76  After supplementing golf course revenue 
with money from the city’s general fund, the Mounds View City 
Council contemplated utilizing revenue-generating billboards that 
would be visible to cars on the highways that border the golf 
course.77  Zoning ordinances, however, rendered the proposition 
difficult. 
At the time, Mounds View’s comprehensive zoning plan did 
not allow billboards in any zoning district.78  The city council thus 
adopted three ordinances during the fall of 1999 and the spring of 
2000 to amend the Mounds View City Zoning Code to permit 
billboards within CRP, Public Facilities (“PF”),79 and Planned Unit 
Development (“PUD”) districts.80  Additionally, a limited-use 
district was created on The Bridges Golf Course property along 
Highway 10 where the billboards were to be allowed.81  The 
planning commission unanimously voted to recommend that the 
city deny the proposed ordinance, but the city ignored this 
recommendation and approved the ordinance with an automatic 
termination provision to satisfy concerns that the billboards would 
remain after the need for the revenue ended.82  Ordinance 655 was 
thus introduced at a March 2000 city council meeting, when the 
entire city-owned golf course was rezoned to a PF district because 
 
 76. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 3. 
 77. Id.  The city hoped these signs would generate enough revenue to enable 
the golf course to make its payments without assistance from the city’s general 
funds.  Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. In 1984, the city rezoned the large majority of all city-owned property into 
“Public Facilities” (“PF”) districts.  Id.  This designation limited use of the land to 
public buildings, public uses, public parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, parking 
areas, golf courses, public sewers, water lines, water storage areas, public streets, 
easements, public ways, highways, thoroughfares, treatment and pumping 
facilities, and other public utility and public service facilities.  MOUNDS VIEW, 
MINN., ZONING CODE § 1118.02 “2000), available at http://www.ci.mounds-
view.mn.us/docs/ZONING2.pdf. 
 80. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d at 4-5.  The city attorney recommended the 
inclusion of PUD districts in this ordinance to avoid spot zoning concerns.  Id. at 
5.   
 81. Id. at 4. 
 82. Id.  The planning commission provided four reasons for its 
recommendation.  First, the CRP and PF districts are “intended to provide 
recreational opportunities, open space and protect the natural environment 
where possible,” thus billboards “are more appropriate to commercial and 
industrial zoning districts.”  Id.  Second, billboards “can be visually distractive.”  Id.  
Third, “the city cannot limit billboards to city-owned properties only.”  Id.  Fourth, 
“[s]tate statutes restrict [billboards] to commercial and industrial zoning districts” 
and the proposed sites were not so zoned.  Id. at 4-5. 
14
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its former zoning classifications, CRP and Industrial, were deemed 
inconsistent with the city’s comprehensive plan.83 
In May 2000, Eller Media, an outdoor advertising company, 
applied for six permits with the Minnesota Department of 
Transportation (“MNDOT”) to construct billboards on the golf 
course.84  MNDOT denied the permits on the ground that the 
proposed location did not comply with the Minnesota Outdoor 
Advertising Control Act.85  Eller Media challenged this denial 
before an administrative law judge, and the city intervened in the 
proceeding.86 
The administrative law judge recommended that the permits 
be issued, and a subsequent report was submitted to the 
Commissioner of MNDOT.87  The Commissioner, however, denied 
the permits on three grounds: Mounds View’s actions amounted to 
spot zoning and violated 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b);88 the commercial 
use of the golf course was merely incidental and violated 23 C.F.R. 
§ 750.708(d);89 and the golf course was not a “business area” under 
the Minnesota Act.90  The City of Mounds View appealed. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the Commissioner 
and directed MNDOT to issue the permits.91  The court of appeals 
found that the golf course was a “business area” under the 
Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control Act on the basis that 
Minnesota’s Act focuses on the use of the land rather than the 
zoning label.92  The court reasoned that not only was the golf 
course engaged in “business activity,” but the PF zone specifically 
listed “golf courses,” which are engaged in business activity, and 
 
 83. Id. at 5-6. 
 84. Id. at 6. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 89. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 90. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 6. 
 91. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device 
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d 492, 504 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), 
rev’d, 604 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003). 
 92. Id. at 499-500.  “The commissioner’s deputy’s interpretation that ‘business 
area’ does not include municipal owned land adds something to the statute that 
the legislature did not impose.  This goes beyond interpretation of the statute and 
represents its will not its judgment and is thus arbitrary and capricious.”  Id. at 501.  
The court of appeals also noted that MNDOT had previously granted permits for 
billboards on government-owned land in another municipality’s PF district.  Id. at 
497.   
15
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thus rendered the property “zoned for business.”93 
The court further held that in applying the necessary federal 
regulations, the golf course was not an “incidental use” of the land 
because the golf course business was the sole activity conducted on 
the land.94  The city’s actions similarly did not constitute spot 
zoning, which the federal regulations expressly prohibit.95  The 
court of appeals reasoned that Mounds View operated under a 
comprehensive zoning plan and therefore the fact that the action 
was created to permit outdoor advertising was not determinative.96  
MNDOT petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review. 97   
B. The Decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court employed a 
substantial evidence test,98 giving deference to the Commissioner of 
MNDOT, but reserved the right “to review de novo errors of law 
which arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of 
words in a statute.”99 
 
 93. Id. at 500.  
 94. Id.  The court applied 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(d) which specifies that zones 
“in which limited commercial or industrial activities are permitted as an incident 
to other primary land uses [are] not considered to be a commercial or industrial 
zone for outdoor advertising control purposes.”  Id.   
 95. Id. at 501-02.  The regulation states that the outdoor advertising 
exception will not be permitted if the action was not part of the comprehensive 
plan and the action occurred primarily to permit outdoor advertising structures.  
23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (2004) (emphasis added).  The city rezoned the golf course 
to a PF district to bring it into consistency with the comprehensive plan.  In re 
Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device Permits in the 
City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d at 501-02.  The FHWA refuted this 
interpretation, stating that a zoning action, although consistent with the 
comprehensive plan, violates the Beautification Act if the underlying purpose is to 
permit billboards.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY 
ADMINISTRATION, Legal Opinion on the FHWA's Interpretation of 23 CFR § 750.708(b), 
Acceptance of State Zoning for Purposes of the Highway Beautification Act, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/zoningop.htm (last modified May 4, 2004) 
(legal opinion requested by the State of Minnesota in connection with the Eller 
Media case) [hereinafter Legal Opinion].   
 96. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device 
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d at 501. 
 97. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003).   
 98. Id. at 7.  In reviewing an agency decision, Minnesota courts are to exercise 
judicial restraint, “lest [they] substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency.”  
Id.  They will not disturb an agency’s decision “as long as the agency’s 
determination has adequate support in the record as required by the substantial 
evidence test.”  Id.   
 99. Id. at 6-7. 
16
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The court first rejected Eller Media’s and Mounds View’s 
argument that the industrial characteristics of the surrounding 
areas were significant.100  The court found that because these areas 
were not located in the City of Mounds View, their zoning 
designations were irrelevant.101  Eller Media and Mounds View also 
argued that activities such as a water treatment plant, a city office 
complex, a water tower, and a golf course are conducted in PF 
districts, so PF districts are zoned for commercial or business 
activities under the Minnesota Act.102  The court similarly rejected 
this argument, holding that a use permitted in both PF and 
business districts does not make the PF district “most appropriate” 
for commerce.103 
The court applied the Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control 
Act, the Highway Beautification Act, and the City of Mounds View’s 
comprehensive plan to reverse the court of appeals.104  The 
Minnesota Act mandates compliance with federal law; thus the 
majority opinion held that the use of a PF-zoned golf course must 
also comply with the Beautification Act’s definition of commercial 
or industrial use.105  The majority, relying on the Commissioner of 
MNDOT’s findings, found that the PF district was not the “most 
appropriate” use for commerce, industry, or trade because other 
districts existed in Mounds View that the city’s comprehensive plan 
had zoned specifically for business and industrial purposes.106  “The 
overriding purpose of land use in Mounds View’s PF districts is the 
public character of the land use and dedication to public needs 
and access . . . [thus] Mounds View intended to make [its PF] 
district distinct from its business district.”107  The court reasoned 
that if the city believed that the golf course was appropriate for 
commerce, industry, or trade, it would have designated it as a 
business area.108  The court concluded that the golf course was not 
“zoned for business, industrial, or commercial activities” and 
therefore was not a “business area” as required by the Minnesota 
 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 9-10. 
 104. Id. at 7, 10. 
 105. Id. at 7. 
 106. Id. at 10. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
17
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Outdoor Advertising Control Act.109 
In dissent, Justice Hanson took another approach to applying 
the control acts by liberally interpreting the Highway Beautification 
Act not as a mechanism to control outdoor advertising, but as a 
mechanism to provide incentives to states to implement laws that 
effectively control advertising devices.110  Unlike the majority, 
Justice Hanson did not defer to the Commissioner of MNDOT’s 
decision because the underlying facts were not in dispute.111  
Instead, he concluded that the critical issue, whether or not a 
municipal golf course qualifies as a “business area” or a district 
“most appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade,” was a 
question of law.112  Justice Hanson determined that the Minnesota 
Act effectively controls outdoor advertising devices and that the 
only question to be determined was whether the language of the 
statute permits such signs on a PF-zoned public golf course.113  
Focusing on the use of the property and not on ownership or 
labels, Justice Hanson reasoned that the zoning actions of the city 
were an effort to comply with the comprehensive plan and, 
therefore, no spot zoning had occurred.114  Most importantly, the 
dissent concluded that The Bridges Golf Course, despite being 
publicly owned, was operated as a business and that these activities 
effectively made the golf course a business area.115 
 
 109. Id.  The court reasoned that the local government should zone an area 
for commerce to provide for such activities.  Id.  According to the court, 
commercial activities that are permitted in a non-commercial zone do not render 
the zone commercial.  Id. at 9.  The court rejected Eller Media’s and Mounds 
View’s contention that the properties surrounding the golf course were zoned 
industrial, warehouse, or office park, and, therefore, the PF district is zoned for 
business or commercial activities under the definition in the Minnesota Act.  Id.  It 
held that surrounding areas do not dictate the zoning category of adjacent 
property, especially when those areas are located in different municipalities.  Id.  
“To conclude otherwise would eviscerate the very power given to municipal 
officials to govern within their jurisdiction and could create a domino effect with 
one governing body’s decisions affecting the zoning decisions in neighboring 
communities.”  Id.   
 110. Id. at 12 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 11. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 13. 
 114. Id. at 14.  Justice Hanson reasoned that the use of the property was not 
incidental because the golf course was the primary use of the zoned land.  Id. at 
14-15. 
 115. Id.  The city’s PF designation was based on ownership, not on use.  The 
outdoor control acts “are indifferent to ownership . . . [and rely] on the activities 
conducted on the property.”  Id. at 15.   
18
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IV. ANALYSIS 
As a matter of first impression, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
interpreted the business area exception to the Minnesota Outdoor 
Advertising Control Act in conjunction with the Federal Highway 
Beautification Act.116  The court faced the difficult task of 
reconciling these laws with the City of Mounds View’s 
comprehensive zoning plan.117  Analysis of the court’s decision must 
begin with the regulations that have been promulgated by the 
Federal Highway Administration because the Minnesota Act is to be 
construed in light of the policies behind the Highway 
Beautification Act.118 
A. The Minnesota Act in Light of the Highway Beautification Act 
In 1975, the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) 
promulgated policies and regulations to implement the 
Beautification Act.119  The stated purpose of these regulations is “to 
assure that there is effective State control of outdoor advertising in 
areas adjacent to Interstate and Federal-aid primary highways.”120  
The FHWA regulations define “commercial” and “industrial” zones 
as those districts that states determine are “most appropriate for 
commerce, industry, or trade, regardless of how labeled.”121  The 
language suggests that the use of the land, not the zoning label, is 
important for Beautification Act purposes.122 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that Minnesota’s 
definition of a “business area”123 must be interpreted in light of the 
Beautification Act, which it was enacted to implement.124  The 
Beautification Act defines commercial and industrial zones as 
“those districts established by the zoning authorities as being most 
appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade, regardless of how 
labeled.”125  Instead of focusing on the “regardless of how labeled” 
 
 116. Id. at 7.   
 117. See id.   
 118. MINN. STAT. § 173.185 (2002).    
 119. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.701-.713 (2004). 
 120. Id. § 750.701 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. § 750.703(a) (emphasis added). 
 122. See id. 
 123. A business area is “any part of an adjacent area which is zoned for 
business, industrial, or commercial activities.”  MINN. STAT.  § 173.02, subd. 17 
(2002). 
 124. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003). 
 125. 23 C.F.R. § 750.703(a) (emphasis added). 
19
Stensland: Case Note: Property Law—Outdoor Advertising Control Acts Slice Ci
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
STENSLAND (CB & CKI & LSK) 11/14/2004  5:50:28 PM 
650 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
language, the majority emphasized the “most appropriate” 
language, stating that the commercial use must be so prevalent that 
the City of Mounds View would have labeled it as a commercial or 
industrial zone.126  The court determined that the Mounds View 
comprehensive plan created both PF and business districts in order 
to distinguish between public and commercial purposes.127  The 
court thus concluded that the city specifically intended PF districts 
to be separate from those districts designated for commercial, 
industrial, or business activities.128 
In reality, Mounds View’s comprehensive plan distinguished 
PF districts based on ownership; land actually used for any use was 
zoned PF because it was owned by the city.129  Therefore, the Public 
Facilities (“PF”) designation is most appropriate for any city-owned 
land, including land on which commercial activities take place.130  
As such, the majority should have reasonably interpreted the 
comprehensive plan as naming several districts as most appropriate 
for business and commercial activities: business districts, industrial 
districts, and PF districts. 
B. Controlling Abuse of the Highway Beautification Act 
Because the Beautification Act gave states the power to zone 
areas as commercial or industrial, legislators naturally feared that 
municipalities would zone land as such for the sole purpose of 
circumventing the Beautification Act, abusing the allowance of 
billboards in these zones.131  The FHWA, therefore, promulgated 
 
 126. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 10. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. “[A]ll city owned property is ‘supposed’ to be zoned PF, according to the 
City Code.”  JAMES ERICSON, CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW STAFF REPORT, at 
http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/PF-report.pdf (relaying the results of the 
“Public Hearing to Consider the Introduction and First Reading of Ordinance 
720, an Ordinance Rezoning all Parcels Currently Zoned PF, Public Facilities”). 
 130. See MOUNDS VIEW, MINN., ZONING CODE §§ 1118.01-.02 (1997) (PF, the 
Public Facilities District), http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/docs/ZONING2.pdf. 
 131. Legal Opinion, supra note 95.  “Some witnesses . . . speculated that the 
States, if left to themselves in this matter, would engage in ‘strip zoning’ and thus 
zone large stretches of highways as industrial solely for the purpose of outdoor 
advertising.”  Id.  During final discussions of the HBA in 1965, Senator Jennings 
Randolph explained the extent of a state’s zoning powers in light of the 
commercial exception.  Id.  “This language, of course, does not mean that a state 
or local authority could place a label ‘zoned commercial or industrial’ on land 
adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems solely to permit billboards or 
junkyards and thereby frustrate the intent of Congress.”  Id. 
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regulations specifically to differentiate between legitimate, 
comprehensive zoning versus actions that are not true zoning; 
legitimate commercial and industrial zones versus limited purpose 
areas created primarily to allow outdoor advertising; and legitimate 
zoning actions versus actions that appear to be part of 
comprehensive zoning but are actually schemes to allow outdoor 
advertising.132  Two provisions of the FHWA’s regulations, discussed 
below, are specifically aimed to prevent sham or phony zoning.133 
In rejecting Mounds View’s applications for billboard permits, 
the Commissioner of MNDOT held that the city’s zoning actions 
violated these regulations.134  Both the dissent and the court of 
appeals disagreed.135  The supreme court did not specifically 
consider these rules because once it found that the PF zone was not 
“most appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade,” the issue of 
sham or phony zoning was irrelevant.136  Upon examination of the 
Eller Media situation, it is apparent that the City of Mounds View’s 
zoning actions were legitimate and that an inquiry into the actual 
use of the land was, and is, imperative. 
1. The Mounds View Comprehensive Plan and C.F.R. Section 
750.708(b) 
The first FHWA regulation, section 750.708(b), addresses spot 
zoning concerns and states that zoning which is not part of a 
comprehensive plan, but is conducted primarily to allow outdoor 
advertising, will not qualify as a commercial or industrial zone 
under the Beautification Act.137  The FHWA issued a report that 
 
 132. See Legal Opinion, supra note 95.  The FHWA looks at a variety of factors, 
beyond a zone’s label, to determine if the underlying purpose of a zoning action is 
to circumvent the Beautification Act.  Id.  These factors include the expressed 
reasons for the zoning change, the zoning for the surrounding area, the actual 
land uses nearby, the existence of plans for commercial or industrial development, 
the availability of utilities in the newly zoned area, and the existence of access to 
roads or dedicated access to the newly zoned area.  Id.  A combination of the 
above factors determines whether the FHWA will consider the zoning action as 
legitimate under the Beautification Act.  Id. 
 133. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (discussed infra Part IV.B.1.); 23 C.F.R. § 
750.708(d) (discussed infra Part IV.B.2). 
 134. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2003). 
 135. Id. at 10 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id.  
 137. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (2004).  Litigation over this regulation has 
occurred in several states.  See, e.g., Files v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 
925 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Ark. 1996) (holding that a commercial zoning designation 
was given for the purpose of constructing billboards based on evidence that 
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expanded the scope of the regulation after the State of Minnesota 
requested an opinion on the correct interpretation of the rule.138  
According to the FHWA, “[a]ctions that are facially part of 
comprehensive zoning, but in fact are merely schemes to allow 
outdoor advertising in rural or residential areas, are not accepted 
by the FHWA as valid zoning for purposes of control of outdoor 
advertising.”139  Section 750.708(b) mandates that a zoning action 
be a legitimate exercise of zoning powers in accordance with the 
municipality’s planning goals, instead of sham zoning for the 
primary purpose of permitting outdoor advertising.140 
Furthermore, the report states that despite an area being 
comprehensively zoned, if pockets of land are zoned as commercial 
or industrial based solely on the commercial or industrial nature of 
outdoor advertising, the result is spot zoning.141  Such a result 
would violate the Beautification Act.142  Section 750.708(b) 
therefore aims to prevent spot zoning by restricting billboards to 
legitimately zoned commercial and industrial areas.143  The intent 
behind this regulation is to prevent municipalities from hiding 
behind a comprehensive plan when zoned areas are not truly 
 
adjacent commercially zoned land with billboards was being used only for 
agricultural purposes and that the plaintiff, a known billboard entrepreneur, 
admitted that he had no plans to develop the land at issue); Lamar Outdoor 
Adver. Inc. v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 133 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2003) (holding that the zoning action was taken to permit the construction 
of billboards); United Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Bus., Transp., Hous. Agency, 746 
P.2d 877, 882 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the area was zoned for the sole purpose of 
constructing billboards, and thus violated the Beautification Act); Redpath v. Mo. 
Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 14 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 
23 C.F.R. § 750.708 (b) requires a determination of why a particular area was 
zoned commercial or industrial); Penn Adver. Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 608 A.2d 
1115, 1116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that even though an area was zoned 
commercial, it violated the Beautification Act because the city had illegally spot 
zoned the area). 
 138. Legal Opinion, supra note 95.  This report was issued after both the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court issued decisions 
on the situation at hand.  Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  South Dakota comprehensively zoned all areas along Interstate and 
Federal-aid primary systems as commercial or industrial when most of the 
surrounding areas were used for agricultural purposes.  South Dakota v. Volpe, 
353 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.S.D. 1973) (holding that although the land was 
comprehensively zoned, the strip zoning violated the purpose of the Beautification 
Act and thus billboards were not permitted). 
 143. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (2004). 
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commercial or industrial.  This regulation demands a close look at 
the use of the land to determine if the land is actually used for 
commercial or industrial purposes.144 
In this case, Mounds View acted pursuant to its comprehensive 
plan to correctly rezone the golf course, a city-owned property, as a 
PF district.  In addition, the commercial nature of the PF zone does 
not arise solely from the commercial nature of billboard activities.  
Despite being publicly owned, The Bridges Golf Course is a 
commercial use of land.145  Mounds View’s actions are not in 
violation of section 750.708(b). 
2. Incidental Use and C.F.R. Section 750.708(d) 
The second FHWA regulation, section 750.708(d), states that 
areas on which “commercial or industrial activities are permitted as 
an incident to other primary land uses are not considered to be . . . 
commercial or industrial” zones under the Beautification Act.146  A 
Wisconsin court has interpreted this regulation to determine if a 
conditional use is incidental to primary use.147  The court found 
that a conditional use that is expressly permitted by an ordinance is 
not inconsistent with other uses in the zone and therefore is not 
subordinate to primary use.148  The use is itself a primary use and 
can be considered for Beautification Act purposes.149  A use that is 
specifically permitted is neither subordinate nor automatically 
deemed “incidental.”150 
Ascertaining the actual use of the land is essential to a correct 
determination of whether a commercial or industrial use is 
 
 144. See Volpe, 353 F. Supp. at 340. 
 145. The course generates revenue from green fees, lessons, merchandise, and 
food.  Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2003) (Hanson, J., dissenting).  The 
city residents do not receive any discount, and in fact, golfers pay some of the 
highest green fees in the area for a round at The Bridges.  Id.  Green and range 
fees at The Bridges for the 2004 season are $15 for nine holes of golf and $10 for a 
jumbo bucket of balls.  The Bridges Golf Course, Rates, http://www. 
bridgesgolf.com/rates.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 146. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(d) (2004).  Something is incidental if it has a minor 
role or is “subordinate to something of greater importance.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 777 (8th ed. 2004). 
 147. Wis. Dep’t of Transp. v. Office of Comm’r of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 15 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1986).   
 148. Id. at 16-17; see also Alper v. State, 621 P.2d 492, 495 (Nev. 1980) (holding 
that the actual and contemplated uses of the zoned land should be examined 
instead of just the zoning label). 
 149. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 400 N.W.2d at 16-17. 
 150. Id. 
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incidental.151  The Minnesota Court of Appeals correctly did so and 
opined that because the golf course is not only expressly permitted 
in a PF-zone but is also the sole activity conducted on the land, it 
cannot constitute an incidental use.152  The golf course, a business 
area, is actually located on the area where the billboards are to be 
constructed.  In no way can it be reasoned that the commercial 
nature of the revenue-generating public golf course is incidental to 
the revenue potentially generated by billboard advertising. 
C. The Crucial Step: What is the Actual Use? 
As discussed above, the FHWA regulations mandate an 
examination of the actual use of the land.  The majority opinion, 
however, overlooked this step and construed the definition of 
“business area” from the Minnesota Act to mean that the label of 
the district must be commercial, industrial, or business.153  The 
court would have been wise to look beyond the name of the zone to 
the actual use of the land and the reasons behind the zoning 
ordinances.154  Granted, if the land in question had been zoned for 
commercial or industrial activities and no actual development was 
planned or contemplated for the near future, the area should be 
restricted by the Beautification Act.155  However, if an area such as 
 
 151. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that this regulation demands an 
examination beyond the zoning label to the actual use of the area.  Alper, 621 P.2d 
at 495.  Cf.  Drayton v. Dep’t of Transp., 62 P.3d 430, 434 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) 
(reversing the Department of Transportation’s finding that “[i]n short . . . the 
land at the location of the sign is at most an incidental storage facility, in place as 
an attempt to qualify the land for signing purposes”). 
 152. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device 
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d 492, 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), 
rev’d 664 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003).  But see Drayton, 62 P.3d at 434 (holding that the 
use of the land in question was as a storage facility, incidental to the main business 
located in another location and constructed for the sole purpose of allowing 
billboards). 
 153. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device 
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d at 500.  “The city has recognized 
a difference between areas zoned for business and areas zoned for public purposes 
. . . and clearly knew how to zone for business, commercial, and industrial areas 
and ha[s] specifically done so in its comprehensive plan.”  Id. 
 154. As did the dissent.  Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2003) (Hanson, 
J., dissenting) see also Files v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 925 S.W.2d 404, 
408-09 (Ark. 1996) (holding that the department should look behind zoning 
labels to the purposes of the zoning ordinances); Alper, 621 P.2d at 495 (holding 
that a “determination should [be] made as to the status of the area on which each 
billboard is located”). 
 155. See Alper, 621 P.2d at 495. 
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The Bridges is zoned and actually used or contemplated for 
commercial purposes, then billboards ought to be permitted.156  By 
overlooking this crucial step, the court misapplied the Minnesota 
Outdoor Advertising Control Act in light of the regulations that 
have been promulgated by the FHWA.  But what about the public 
policy concerns that originally sparked enactment of outdoor 
advertising control legislation? 
D. Theory versus Fact: The Policies Behind Outdoor Advertising Control 
The result of the Eller Media decision does theoretically comply 
with the overall hope of President Johnson to “protect the public 
investment in . . . highways, to promote the safety and recreational 
value of public travel, and to preserve natural beauty.”157  It is 
plausible that the Beautification Act permitted billboards in 
commercial and industrial areas because they are not as 
aesthetically pleasing or worthy of protection as other areas.158  The 
Bridges’ situation is unique, however, because although the area is 
used for a legitimate commercial or industrial purpose, a golf 
course is inherently a beautiful, green space, and the view from the 
adjacent highway could be marred if billboards were constructed. 
Although the Eller Media decision may have preserved the 
natural beauty of the golf course, the decision disregarded the fact 
that the Beautification Act, the Minnesota Act, and the FHWA 
regulations are meant to allow states to utilize outdoor advertising 
in those areas legitimately used for commercial or industrial 
purposes.159  The Beautification Act seeks to balance the conflicting 
interests of commerce and conservationists.  Municipalities that 
properly follow the mechanics of these laws should be permitted to 
construct billboards as the laws expressly permit.  Furthermore, 
Minnesota has effectively controlled outdoor advertising by 
enacting the Minnesota Act and allowing billboards only in 
“business areas.”160  The Bridges Golf Course, although zoned for 
 
 156. See id. 
 157. The Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C § 131(a) (2000). 
 158. “There is no extensive discussion of the rationale for the 
industrial/commercial exception in the hearings or in the congressional debates,” 
but one possible rationale is that “industrial and commercial areas are not 
inherently attractive and hence are not worthy of beautification protection.”  
Albert, supra note 37, at 508. 
 159. See 23 U.S.C § 131(a); MINN. STAT. §§ 173.01-.27 (2002); 23 C.F.R. § 
750.701 (2004). 
 160. See MINN. STAT.  § 173.01. 
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“Public Facilities,” is just such a business area.  By not permitting 
the use of billboards in a legitimate business area, the Eller Media 
decision tipped the balance in favor of conservationists and 
ignored legitimate commercial interests.     
V. CONCLUSION:  THE BRIDGES IN 2004 
John C. Kluczynski, chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Roads, said in reference to the Beautification Act, “I believe we 
have enacted a can of worms.”161  The veracity of his statement 
certainly is exemplified by the Eller Media case.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court struggled to untangle the outdoor advertising 
control acts and regulations.  As a result, the City of Mounds View 
was forced to jump through hoop after hoop to achieve the result 
to which it was legally entitled. 
On October 13, 2003, the Mounds View City Council approved 
and adopted two ordinances to rezone the PF areas into 
designations consistent with the actual use of the land instead of 
ownership.162  On July 8, 2004, after a four-year battle with MNDOT 
and the Minnesota court system, having spent over a million dollars 
in internal loans to the golf course, the City of Mounds View 
received approval from MNDOT to erect billboards on The Bridges 
Golf Course.163  Despite the additional revenue from the billboards, 
the golf course was still unable to meet its debt payments by 
$40,000 to $50,000.164 
 
 161. Enfield, supra note 44, at 150. 
 162. MOUNDS VIEW, MINN., CITY ORDINANCES §§ 720-721 (Oct. 13, 2003), 
available at http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/ords.htm.  The Bridges is now 
designated as “Light Industrial” (LI).  Id.  The city added its name to the golf 
course to assure residents that it was still tied to the city.  Allen Powell II, All 
Options on Table for Mounds View Golf Course, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 22, 2004, 
at 6B.  Other uses permitted in PF districts were also rezoned.  City parks and city 
wells are now zoned “Residential” (R-1).  JAMES ERICSON, CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW 
STAFF REPORT, at http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/PF-report.pdf (last viewed 
July 11, 2004).  City hall and the community center are now zoned “Highway 
Business Commercial” (B-3).  Id.  Golf courses, public works garages, and water 
towers are now zoned “Industrial” (I-1).  Id. 
 163. Allen Powell II, Golf Course Billboards OK’d, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 9, 
2004, at B3.  Clear Channel Outdoors plans on constructing six billboards, which 
will be forty-five feet tall, along U.S. Highway 10 on the golf course property for 
about $250,000 per year.  Id. 
 164. Id. The city is considering redeveloping portions of the golf course to 
raise additional revenue.  Id.  In October 2004, after signing a lease with Clear 
Channel, the city asked that the billboard construction be postponed until at least 
March 2005 because an unidentified company had expressed an interest in 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s 
business area exception to the outdoor advertising control acts 
resulted in an extremely inefficient outcome because the decision 
focused on the zoning label instead of the actual use of the land.  If 
the majority had employed a reasonable interpretation of 
Minnesota’s Outdoor Advertising Control Act, instead of an unduly 
strict interpretation, the City of Mounds View could have 
maintained effective control over outdoor advertising by employing 
the legislatively recognized economic power of billboards to resolve 
its budget issue. 
 
 
erecting an office building on the property.  Allen Powell II, Mounds View 
Municipal Golf Course, City Wants Billboard Construction Postponed, Lease Clashing with 
Development Plans, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 7, 2004, at B4.  In 1988, the State of 
Minnesota quitclaimed fifty-five acres of the golf course with a reverter clause that 
requires the city to use the property for a public purpose or the state will retake 
control. Allen Powell II, Golf Course Review Pondered, Environmental Survey, 
Development Possible, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 12, 2004, at B1. The city must 
now determine whether an office building constitutes a public purpose, and if not, 
whether legislative action could void the reverter clause.  Id. 
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